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News Media Coverage of Corporate Tax Avoidance and Corporate Tax Reporting 
 
 
Abstract 
Drawing upon media agenda-setting theory and previous studies in organizational impression 
management, this paper empirically investigates the influence of tax avoidance news on 
corporate tax reporting. This study is based on the pronounced discontinuity in the amount of 
news articles related to tax avoidance in the United Kingdom over two periods (2010-2011 
and 2012-2013). A difference-in-differences design is employed in order to enable a 
comparison of the media effects on those firms that have been reported in tax avoidance news 
versus those without media attention. Using a sample of annual reports of UK FTSE 100 
companies across the period 2010 to 2013, I test the impact of tax avoidance news on quality 
and quantity of tax disclosure. The results suggest that the recent increase in media attention 
on tax avoidance does not stimulate firms to improve the quality and the quantity of tax 
disclosure in their corporate reporting. Rather, firms can be discouraged from discussing the 
most relevant tax items in their reporting, as shown in the case of financial firms which were 
the subject of the largest amount of tax avoidance news. 
 
Keywords: tax avoidance, income tax disclosure, impression management 
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of the news media on setting a public agenda and shaping public opinions is a 
well-established proposition which has been supported by a broad range of socio-political 
research (Park, 1940; McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Gamson et al., 1989; 1992; Soroka, 2003; 
McCombs, 2014). Such a strong influence of news media is observed for issues in which 
individuals have no direct experience; therefore news media becomes the only main source of 
obtaining information (Ader, 1995; Power, 2004). Where the issue of corporate tax avoidance 
is concerned, news media exerts an effect by translating complex and obscure tax issues into 
simple and provocative messages which then easily penetrate into the public’s mind through 
repetitive broadcasting. As a survey by the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation indicates, 
corporate tax issues remain out of the public eye until the media discovers them, and they 
then become part of social concern only if the media and the public begin to focus their 
attention on those matters (Freedman et al., 2007). 
 
On 12 November 2012, the UK Public Accounts Committee held a public hearing to address 
some of the world's most-recognized firms on the issue of tax avoidance. The live broadcast 
of the hearing and intense media attention have led to an unprecedented volume of news 
addressing tax avoidance and ignited public intolerance towards tax unfairness issues 
(Christian Aid, 2013; Garside, 2014). The number of British news articles reporting corporate 
tax abuse almost doubled in 2012 and 2013 compared to that in 2010 and 2011.
1
 
 
When a company is labelled as a “tax avoider” by media (BBC, 2012a), it encounters 
reputational risk and legitimacy threats (Lanis and Richardson, 2012). Interviews with tax 
executives by Mulligan and Oats (2009) suggest that tax managers raise concerns about the 
role of the media in the context of reputational risk, noting “we try not to do things that’ll get 
us written up on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.” (p. 688). Foreseeable adverse 
consequences entail a good reason for companies to take an impression management 
approach as a defensive or preventive measure if their tax practice is viewed as abusive 
during the peak of media attention. To maintain legitimacy and regain reputation, companies 
could use rhetorical devices (Thomas, 1997; Yuthas et al., 2002) or increase disclosure of 
relevant information in the corporate annual reports (Gray et al., 1995). However, companies 
may not alter their tax reporting behaviours, as the nature of tax information is different from 
                                                 
1
 Number of articles from a search of FACTIVA (business database including all news sources). See Figure 1. 
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that of corporate social reporting (for example, environmental disclosure) in terms of legal 
complexity. In this regard, testimony by one of the witnesses at the hearing illustrates the 
practical challenges in tax reporting, stating "[...] the global tax structure is very complex. It 
is very difficult to explain it, and that is without having anything to do with avoidance. It is 
just a difficult challenge." (House of Commons, 2012). 
 
Although there are increasing legal compliance obligations and public demands for detailed 
tax disclosure by multinational corporations (MNCs) (HM Revenue and Customs, 2013; PwC, 
2013; OECD, 2014; The Guardian, 2014), the question as to how firms present their tax 
practices as a response to media pressure has not been tested empirically. Therefore, this 
study investigates whether media pressure relates to a change in the volume of tax disclosure 
in audited financial statements (i.e. quantity), and the contents of tax information in the 
corporate annual reports – which relates to tax items, particularly tax avoidance (i.e. quality). 
The reason for relying on corporate annual reports rather than referring to other types of 
corporate communication venues, such as press releases or corporate websites, is a high level 
of credibility of corporate annual reports supported by audited financial statements. As the 
reports are intended to fulfil the regulatory disclosure requirements (including International 
Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS), tax information in the reports is believed to be relevant 
and reliable information that users are looking for. Moreover, extensive literature on 
corporate disclosure heavily utilizes the corporate annual report due to its effective merits of 
communicating to external users (Stanton and Stanton, 2002). Through its narrative sections, 
it is also regarded as an effective vehicle for impression management by sending a message 
as to what is important for the companies, and thus reflecting a company's stance on the 
current issue (Neu et al., 1998; Guthrie et al., 2004). By identifying the relationships between 
media attention and corporate tax reporting, one can infer whether intense media coverage of 
tax can lead to desirable outcomes, namely increasing both the quality and quantity of tax 
disclosure. 
 
Consequently, this study contributes to existing literature which has examined the effects of 
public pressure on corporate governance, but which focused less on corporate tax 
communication in relation to tax avoidance issues. By using a unique set of hand-collected 
dataset, this study attempts to shed light on firms’ behaviours with regard to the effects of 
public pressure on tax transparency and ongoing public debates on corporate tax avoidance. 
The research questions investigated in this study are as follows: 
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1. Are companies more likely to address key tax items that particularly address tax 
avoidance concerns when their tax practices are challenged by news media during the 
high media attention period? 
 
2. Are companies more likely to increase the volume of tax disclosure in their financial 
statements when their tax practices are challenged by news media during the high 
media attention period? 
 
To identify media attention, I collect news with topics related to tax avoidance from major 
UK news media outlets during the period from 2010 to 2013. Based on the pronounced 
discontinuity between the period of 2010-2011 and 2012-13, I separate the testing period into 
a low and high media attention period. These two different sets of data allow a comparison of 
annual reports before and after the peak of media attention with a compounding effect of the 
media intensity in terms of the volume of tax avoidance news articles in relation to each 
company. The firm sample is taken from FTSE 100 multinational corporations listed in the 
UK London Stock Exchanges during 2012, with the data being corporate annual reports from 
2010 to 2013. Data on quantity and quality of tax disclosure is hand collected from the 
respective firms’ corporate annual reports. The total number of words in the tax disclosure in 
the notes section of the audited financial statements is counted as a quantity measure. To test 
the quality of tax disclosure, the entire sections of the annual reports are read and evaluated 
according to the disclosure index. 
 
In short, the study finds no significant results supporting the media influence on the quantity 
of tax disclosure. The quality of tax disclosure, in terms of firms' addressing the most relevant 
key tax items, is not positively related to the intensity of media pressure during the high 
media attention period. Instead, a negative relationship between the quality and media 
intensity is observed from the case of financial firms which received the highest number of 
news articles addressing tax avoidance issues. Taken together, the results suggest that the 
recent increase in media attention on tax avoidance does not stimulate firms to improve tax 
disclosure in their corporate reports; rather, it can discourage the firms from discussing the 
most relevant tax items when they are at the centre of media attention. 
 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the research background and prior 
literature which enable hypotheses development. Section 3 illustrates the research design. 
Results and findings are analysed in Section 4, and Section 5 offers conclusions. 
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2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
 
2.1. Tax shaming and corporate self-defence 
 
The oral evidence of Amazon, Google and Starbucks taken before the UK Public Accounts 
Committee public hearing on the issue of tax avoidance symbolizes how companies would 
represent themselves when the public puts them to tax shame.
2
 What is noticed in their 
testimony is that they defend their tax position by using words concerned with ethics, moral 
values and the social order, such as "ethics".
3
 A symbolic catchword in the recent economic-
political debate, "transparency",
4
 was also frequently mentioned during the hearing. The 
testimony below by the representatives of Amazon, Google and Starbucks illustrates how 
such words were used: 
"We sincerely believe that we are doing everything to an ethical standard – not just 
the legal standard, but exactly what we should be doing.” 
 
"We are trying to be very transparent. I assure you that our intent is to operate at the 
highest ethical standards.” (House of Commons, 2012). 
 
The frequent use of such affirmative words appears to reflect the awareness of corporate 
reputational damage. With regard to the concept of reputation at risk, Power (2004) explains 
the idea of an "expectation gap" where there is a gulf between public expectation of 
performance and public perception of that performance. By representing itself in a more 
socially affirmative way, a corporation seeks to regain public acceptance (Gray et al., 1995). 
Extending this line of thinking to the situation where the media and public are accusing 
companies avoiding taxes of being immoral,
5
 how to communicate tax matters and manage 
corporate image in relation to tax becomes one of the primary agenda items for firms (Ernst 
and Young, 2012; 2014). For example, with regard to its tax avoidance schemes which were 
extensively reported during the period of 2012-2013, Barclays acknowledges risk by stating: 
                                                 
2
 Similar cases of public hearings are also found in the United States. In September 2012, the cases of offshore 
tax avoidance schemes by Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard were investigated. In May 2013, the Subcommittee 
examined offshore profit shifting and tax avoidance by Apple Inc. See 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media. 
3
 Harvard General Inquirer word lists; see http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer/homecat.htm. 
4
 Forssbaeck, J. and Oxelheim, L. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5
 "We're not accusing you of being illegal; we're accusing you of being immoral", stated by Margaret Hodge, a 
Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, during the public hearing on Amazon, Google and Starbucks. 
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There is risk that the Group could suffer losses due to additional tax charges, other 
financial costs or reputational damage due to: failure to comply with, or correctly 
assess the application of, relevant tax law; failure to deal with tax authorities in a 
timely, transparent and effective manner (including in relation to historical 
transactions which might have been perceived as aggressive in tax terms) […] 
(Barclays, 2013 Annual Report, p. 140) 
 
In recent years there seems to be a growing trend that more firms are explaining their tax 
management in the corporate responsibility section, regardless of the level of media attention 
to their tax affairs. Schroders, a financial institution listed in the FTSE 100, is a good 
example for this case. Although there is no tax avoidance news in relation to Schroders 
during the period of 2010 to 2013, it claims its tax stance by stating that “Schroders is 
committed to conducting its tax affairs in an open and transparent way.” within the corporate 
responsibility section of its 2012 and 2013 annual reports. Considering that a series of tax 
scandals by banks has caused the public to perceive the financial industry to be the root cause 
of aggressive tax schemes, the case of Schroders would represent what is referred to as the 
collective response of industries to legitimacy threats (Herremans et al., 2009). As Barnett 
(2006) and King and Lenox (2000) suggest, members of an industry are subject to the 
difficulty of mobilizing collective action, and are judged by a collective notion regardless of 
their individual corporate performance. 
 
Another noteworthy reaction by firms is their not taking any action towards adverse tax 
publicity. Benoit (1997) explains that a firm does not necessarily respond to the public threats 
because responding itself implies the firm's acceptance of those accusations. This strategy is 
also found in one of telecommunications companies. In spite of accumulating tax avoidance 
news about the firm during 2010-2013, its annual reports during that period do not provide 
any specific explanation with regard to alleged tax avoidance matters or any disclaimer 
suggesting that their tax affairs are, in fact, managed in line with ethics or transparency as 
part of corporate responsibility. Another strategy can be to reduce specific disclosure. For 
example one financial institution actually reduced its tax information in terms of the number 
of words in the 2013 annual report after it received negative publicity regarding its tax affairs 
during 2012. This case supports the view suggested by Elsbach et al. (1998) and De Villiers 
and van Staden (2006), explaining that a firm's remedial strategy right after image-
threatening events can backfire if its actions are perceived to be devious; therefore providing 
specific information is believed to be more harmful than helpful in regaining public trust. 
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The cases above indicate that firms adopt various disclosure strategies, but there is very 
limited empirical investigation. These cover the extent to which corporations actually change 
their tax practices in relation to public pressure (Dyreng et al., 2014; Gallemore et al., 2014), 
and the explicit disclosure on tax (Ylönen and Laine, 2015). Therefore, to develop the 
research hypotheses of this study, the next section discusses media agenda-setting theory as a 
theoretical background, as well as prior literature investigating the link between media 
pressure and corporate reporting in a broad context. 
 
2.2. Media exposure and corporate reporting 
 
The fundamental idea of media agenda-setting theory is that "those issues emphasized in the 
news come to be regarded by the public over time as being important." (McCombs, 2014, p. 
4). As Figure 1 demonstrates, mass communication generates a strong influence by 
transferring salience from the media agenda to the public agenda (McComb and Shaw, 1972). 
 
Experimental investigations show evidence of a causal relationship between the form and the 
way of presenting news and the viewers' interpretation of the issues being reported (Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, 1994; de Vreese, 2004). This consequence appears to support the 
propositions of media agenda-setting theory: 
P₁: The amount of news coverage that a firm receives in the news media is positively 
related to the public's awareness of the firm (Carroll and McCombs, 2003, p. 39). 
 
P₂: The amount of news coverage devoted to particular attributes of a firm is 
positively related to the proportion of the public who define the firm by those 
attributes (p. 40). 
 
Considering the recent major media attention on issues of corporate governance, Carroll and 
McCombs (2003) extend this core concept by translating it into a business setting. They 
argue that media brings evaluation criteria that apply to all companies – not only for the 
companies covered in the news. That is, media has the wide spectrum of evaluation criteria, 
and how media portrays the focal firm generates a broader spillover effect which spreads to 
the whole industry (Desai, 2011; Zavyalova et al., 2012). 
 
Among others cases, a number of environmental reporting studies substantiate the above 
argument, providing sound insight into the reaction of firms (or industry as a whole) to 
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controversial corporate misconduct that has attracted media attention. A commonly identified 
trend is a significantly higher level of incident-related disclosure in terms of the number of 
words and positive tones in the contexts after media exposure (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; 
Darrell and Schwartz, 1997; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998; Bewley and Li, 2000; 
Deegan et al., 2000; 2002; Islam and Deegan, 2010). It supports the assertion that “if there is 
increased community concern about environmental issues, driven by increased media 
attention, then the increased concern should be matched by increased disclosures.” (Brown 
and Deegan, 1998, p. 26). Arguably, such increasing information can be interpreted as a 
defensive effort by the firm in question to satisfy public concern and to express its legitimacy 
(Gray et al., 1995; Desai, 2011). This view is also linked to an impression management 
perspective by referring to as a “verbal remedial tactic” or “tactical verbal impression 
management” which converts image-threatening events into image-protecting verbal claims 
(Aerts and Cormier, 2009, p. 23). 
 
As tax information is particularly confidential, one might not be able to expect that corporate 
tax reporting would follow the same trend that is generally found from the cases of corporate 
environmental disclosure. This is because providing extensive tax information can generate 
opposing consequences: it promotes a firm's tax transparency and assures the tax authorities 
and public, at the same time, it reveals a firm's sensitive tax position – which could possibly 
lead to a financial loss to the firm from additional scrutiny by the tax administration. 
Therefore, the matter of providing more detailed tax information can be subject to a firm's 
strategic considerations. However, when firms fear financial losses from reputational harm 
and shaming public sanctions, more than financial losses caused by revealing sensitive tax 
information, they might consider over-disclosure of tax information a sensible strategy 
(Blank, 2008; 2009). Likewise, by inferring from the past cases of major social incidents 
related to the firm, it is reasonable to expect an increase in the rhetoric of words and 
repetitive use of assuring verbal cues in financial reporting (Davison, 2008). 
 
Given the assumption that the issue of corporate tax avoidance is considered to be a corporate 
social incident attracting media attention which eventually deteriorates corporate image, I 
posit the following hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1): A firm will disclose more relevant tax information which 
particularly addresses the key items related to tax avoidance concern (i.e. quality) 
when the firm appears in tax avoidance news during the high media attention period. 
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 Hypothesis 2 (H2): The association between the amount of tax avoidance news 
coverage about a firm and the volume of tax disclosure in its annual report (i.e. 
quantity) will be higher when the firm appear in tax avoidance news during the high 
media attention period. 
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1. Sample and data 
 
For empirical testing, this study uses FTSE 100 firms listed as of 2012 for their high 
representativeness and public visibility. Moreover, a series of investigations by the UK Public 
Accounts Committee on tax avoidance schemes, followed by a stark increase in UK media 
attention, provides a reasonable assumption that UK public firms would be influenced after 
the public hearings on tax avoidance.
6
 The exclusion of firms with a tax exempt status as real 
estate investment trusts (REITs) and mergers reduced the sample size to 93. The final sample 
consists of 372 firm-year observations from 2010 to 2013. Firm-specific financial data is 
collected from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Other main data (in particular, 
quantity and quality of tax disclosure) have been hand collected from corporate annual 
reports for years ended from 2010 to 2013, as obtained from corporate websites. 
I use the following search terms which are commonly occurring key words from all major 
news and business publications in the UK from the FACTIVA database:
7
 "tax avoidance", 
"tax evasion", "tax loophole(s)", "tax haven(s)", "tax transparency" and "aggressive tax 
planning". These key words are searched for each firm-specific observation, and the 
observation period ranges from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2013. This is to capture the 
initial trend of the amount of news coverage of tax aggressiveness which is broadly defined 
as downward management of taxable income through tax planning activities (Frank et al., 
2009) that do not necessarily break the law.
8
 Consistent with prior literature (Chen et al., 
                                                 
6
 The notable event is the tax avoidance cases of Google, Amazon and Starbucks investigated by the UK Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) on 12 November 2012.  Following this, the PAC held a series of public hearings on 
tax avoidance schemes (e.g. on 6 December 2012 and on 31
 
January 2013. The PAC examined the tax 
avoidance schemes promoted by tax advisors and large accountancy firms. On 7 March 2013, the PAC 
questioned the tax authorities (HMRC) regarding their role in preventing tax avoidance. See 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-
committee/publications/?type=&session=2&sort=false&inquiry=all. 
7
 FACTIVA is a global news and information on business and economics provided by Dow Jones & Company. 
8
 It appears that news media refer to “tax avoidance” when they report firms’ being aggressive in tax 
management in general. For example The Guardian (the UK new paper) has a section titled “Tax Avoidance”. 
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2010), I use the terms “tax aggressiveness” and “tax avoidance” interchangeably throughout 
this paper. 
 
Figure 1 shows the search results as a general trend (i.e. firms are unspecified), and obvious 
discontinuity is found between the period of 2010-2011 and 2012-2013.
9
 The same trend is 
also found for the sample firms as shown in Figure 2. The result identifies that 53 of the 
sample companies have been reported in the news at least once relating to tax aggressiveness 
during the period of 2010-2013, while 40 companies have not been reported in the news at 
any time during the observation period. These two different sets of data allow for comparison 
analysis before and after the peak of media attention, with a compounding effect of the 
amount of tax news on each firm. Table 1 summarizes the sample construction. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
3.2. The empirical models and measurement of variables 
 
To test the first hypothesis, I adapt content analysis which is widely used in assessing of 
environmental corporate reporting (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). As there is no 
established disclosure index evaluating quality of tax disclosure particularly associated with 
tax avoidance concern, I refer to commonly identified news headlines and keywords in the 
articles. This is based on the assumption that if media attention raises public concern on a 
particular issue, the increased concern should be matched with increased disclosure (Brown 
and Deegan, 1998). For example after the news headlines such as “Starbucks paid just £8.6m 
UK tax in 14 years” (BBC, 2012b) and “Vodafone: No UK tax to pay on £84bn sale” (BBC, 
2013), the disclosure regarding corporate tax payments would be expected to increase. The 
most frequent keyword (non-monetary term) in tax avoidance news is “transparency”, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Although there can be a difference in definitions distinguishing tax avoidance from tax aggressiveness, news 
articles use the term “tax avoidance” in a broader context which includes tax dodging and aggressive tax 
practices. 
9
 Although the public tax scrutiny by the UK Public Accounts Committee on 22 November 2012 is perceived to 
be one of the most pronounced events of 2012, it did not instantly trigger the highest media attention on tax 
avoidance during 2012. In fact, FACTIVA search results on a monthly basis show that the highest month in 
terms of the volume of news articles related to tax avoidance was June, followed by December, March and 
February 2012. 
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followed by “tax haven(s)”, “corporate social responsibility” and “ethics”. In numerical terms, 
“effective tax rates” and “tax payments” are very frequently mentioned in the news articles. 
In fact, these words were also commonly mentioned during the UK Public Accounts 
Committee hearing of the Amazon, Google and Starbucks cases, as shown in Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
Considering those observations and referring to a tax transparency framework suggested by 
PwC (2013), I develop a disclosure index (Table 3) which has a direct link to the keywords 
that have been intensely debated in the news and during the UK hearing. This attempts to 
evaluate the quality of tax disclosure that addresses tax avoidance concerns specifically and 
to show to what extent a firm uses discretionary disclosure claiming its disassociation from 
tax avoidance in its tax reporting. In order to minimize subjectivity, a flexible range of the 
disclosure quality scale implemented by van Staden and Hooks (2007) is applied (Appendix 
B). That is, some are scored on a 4-point (0-3), a 3-point (0-2) or a 2-point scale (0-1) which 
results in a total possible score of 20. An entire annual report is read and evaluated according 
to the disclosure index, and then a score is assigned for each key tax item found throughout 
the report.
10
 The total score of each firm observation is coded as Qty_tax, which is a proxy 
for the quality of tax disclosure within the context of tax avoidance and a firm's self-
representation as being disassociated from tax avoidance. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
To test the second hypothesis, the extent of a firm’s information provision about its tax 
position is measured by the number of words in tax disclosure in its financial statements as 
part of the annual reports, and is coded as TaxDisc. Tax disclosure refers to descriptive 
information which explains how tax-related financial figures (e.g. income tax expense, tax 
paid, deferred tax assets) are determined, and such information is found in the notes section 
of the audited financial statements. The contents of tax disclosure is hand-collected from the 
financial statements, and then words are counted using TextSTAT (textual analysis software). 
To test both hypotheses above, I use a difference-in-differences design to control for general 
trends and develop the following model: 
                                                 
10
 For example, a firm’s tax risk discussion is commonly found in the governance section of the annual report. 
Depending on the level of detail, a score of 1 or 2 will be assigned. 
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where i denotes the sample companies and t indicates years. 
Independent variables 
Treat equals one if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the 
testing period, and equals zero otherwise.    indicates the average pre-period difference (i.e. 
low media attention period) in disclosure between firms that are the subject of tax news (i.e. 
treatment group) and those not the subject of tax news (i.e. control group). Post equals one 
for firm-year observations ending in 2012-2013 and equals zero in 2010-2011.
11
    reflects 
the control group's average difference in disclosure between the pre- and post-periods (i.e. 
low vs. high media attention period), thus detecting the change due to general trends. 
Intensity is the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the 
firm. As only the firms in the treatment group have a value of Intensity,    captures the 
effects of the amount of tax news on the disclosure within the treatment group. The interacted 
form Treat x Post aims to see the difference between the groups during the post-period, 
represented by  
 
  The primary interest in this study is     which measures the effects of the 
amount of tax news on the disclosure of the treatment group after the peak of media attention 
that is incremental to any general trends observed in the control group. 
 
Control variables 
 
Building on the assumption that it is a firm's tax aggressiveness that leads to a higher chance 
of receiving media attention and would therefore affect the extent of its tax disclosure (Blank, 
2008; 2009), I control for a firm's tax-related characteristics that affect the firm's aggressive 
tax practices (Blouin, 2014). These are effective tax rate (ETR), tax havens and foreign sales. 
ETR has been persistently used as a proxy for tax aggressiveness (Rego, 2003; Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). It is computed as total tax expense divided by pre-tax income. Consistent 
                                                 
11
 A different month of fiscal year-end (e.g. non-December year-end) is not specified for this study because 
FACTIVA search results on a monthly basis show that a heavy volume of tax news is observed throughout 2012 
and 2013. Likewise, a relatively lower volume of tax news is observed on a monthly basis throughout years  
2010 and 2011. 
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with prior literature (Dyreng et al., 2008), the value of ETR is Winsorized at 0 and 1. 
Following the arguments and evidence that tax havens are significantly and positively 
associated with the level of tax avoidance (Desai et al., 2006; Hanlon et al., 2011), a firm's 
use of tax havens is considered. The data are provided by ActionAid (2013), which published 
the full list of tax haven operations of FTSE 100 companies. A significant portion of foreign 
operations can provide a firm with aggressive tax planning opportunities, such as income 
shifting, due to different tax rates in the different jurisdictions in which it has a presence 
(Klassen and Laplante, 2012). Hence, I include the portion of a firm's foreign sales in respect 
to of total sales as another control variable. For the missing data in the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database, I hand-collect from the segment reporting section in the financial 
statements. 
 
Previous studies identify several determinants that influence the level and quality of corporate 
disclosure. The effects of the following factors are generally discussed and, accordingly, they 
are included as control variables: Firm size (Size) (Firth, 1979; Lang and Lundholm, 1993), 
ownership concentration (Ownership) (LaPorta et al., 1998; Birt et al., 2006), and age (Age) 
(Roberts, 1992). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total sales. Ownership 
concentration is considered as the portion of total outstanding shares held by the top 10 
investors in a company. Each sample firm's age is determined from the established year found 
on the corporate website.
12
 Sample firms are classified based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) code, and industry fixed effects are taken into account. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Disclosure quality 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the comparison of average disclosure scores of each firm observation by 
group and period, along with the maximum score in each case. At a glance, the average 
disclosure scores of all items are substantially below the given maximum score of each case, 
except for the case of effective tax rate (ETR) disclosure. 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
                                                 
12
 As the origin of a firm is considered to be from the inception of the firm, a firm's age is not disturbed by 
restructuring or change of legal form. 
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This suggests that most firms have not actively spoken about their stance on tax avoidance 
issues and provided the key tax information. The reason that ETR has a relatively higher 
disclosure score trend is due to the fact that its contents are directly linked to disclosure 
requirements under accounting standards (International Accounting Standard 12 – Income 
Taxes). As such, one could argue that the higher disclosure score for the ETR disclosure case 
is driven by regulatory force, rather than negative news media reports. Nevertheless, the 
quality of ETR disclosure appears to be slightly higher for the treatment group in the post-
period. 
 
Overall differences between the pre- and post-periods and the two groups are not substantial, 
but in general the disclosure scores of the treatment group and the post-period are higher than 
those of the pre-period and the control group, except for the case of tax risk management 
disclosure. It is interesting to see that the firms without media pressure on their tax practices 
(i.e. control group) disclose their tax risk management more than those firms with media 
pressure (i.e. treatment group). It appears that establishing tax risk management and publicly 
discussing it in the annual report reflect corporate “greenwashing”, which is found in the 
social and environmental accounting literature. Laufer (2003) explains the term “greenwash” 
as referring to corporations deliberately managing their pubic presentation so as to “hide 
deviance, deflect attributions of fault, obscure the nature of the problem or allegation, 
reattribute blame, ensure an entity’s reputation and, finally, seek to appear in a leadership 
position” (p. 255). 
 
The score of the tax haven item is not shown in Figure 3 because only one firm (SSE plc) in 
the dataset mentioned its tax stance towards tax havens. For its uniqueness, it is worth noting 
its statement, as follows: 
SSE does not take an aggressive stance in its interpretation of tax legislation, or use 
so-called ‘tax havens’ as a means of reducing its tax liability. SSE’s tax policy is to 
operate within both the letter and spirit of the law at all times (SSE Annual Report 
2012 and 2013). 
 
During the post-period, more firms claim their disassociation from aggressive tax practices 
within the context of ethics or transparency (12% in pre-period, 27% in post-period). 
Likewise, firms use words that are directly referring to tax avoidance, such as "aggressive tax 
practice", "tax avoidance" and "sophisticated tax planning". The selected firms’ disclosure 
below are good examples in this regard: 
15 
 
The Group’s tax planning is consistent with this responsible approach, and it will not 
enter into arrangements which have tax avoidance as their sole objective. (Burberry, 
Annual Report 2012/13). 
 
The Group, which is predominantly UK-based, operates a simple business model and 
does not engage in sophisticated tax planning structures. 
(Wm Morrison Supermarkets PLC, Annual Report and Financial Statements 2012/13) 
 
4.2. Disclosure trends 
 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the trend of the quality and quantity of tax disclosure during the 
period of 2010-2013 for the full sample. At a glance, there is no dramatic jump between the 
pre- (2010-2011) and the post-period (2012-2013) for both disclosure measures. However, 
the treatment group has a higher average disclosure score and volume of tax disclosure than 
the control group. With respect to the quality measure, the average disclosure score ranges 
between 4 and 7 out of the maximum total score of 20. While the average disclosure score 
appears to remain constant during the period of 2010-2012, a slight shift is observed in 2013. 
Compared to 2012, the average score of the treatment group in 2013 increased by 1.24 points 
(5.34 to 6.58), whereas that of the control group increased by 0.6 points. The average total 
number of words in the tax disclosure in the financial statements ranges between 1,400 and 
1,800. The trend regarding quantity of tax disclosure shows a steady growth for both the 
control and treatment groups. Given that accounting standards continue to increase disclosure 
requirements with regard to income tax, it is not possible to rule out a general trend to explain 
the increase in the volume of tax disclosure. To substantiate the differences triggered by 
media pressure, further analysis is conducted with regression tests, and those results are 
discussed in section 4.4. 
<Insert Figure 4 here> 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables. The mean value of tax news hits is 
2.96, with a high standard deviation of 16.81 due to the major UK banks that have the largest 
volume of news articles. As shown in Figure 6, the financial sector has the highest number of 
tax news articles, and this difference is taken into account with industry fixed effects, and by 
running a separate regression test for the financial industry only. With regard to the 
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difference between the treatment and the control group, Table 5 presents a univariate 
comparison for all variables. On average, the treatment group tends to disclose more than the 
control group, as evidenced by higher mean values. The differences between the control and 
treatment group including the pre- and post-period comparisons are significant for the total 
number of words in tax disclosure and the quality of tax disclosure. 
 
Table 6 presents the Pearson correlations for the variables. The correlation analysis illustrates 
that the amount of tax news and the matter of firms being the subject of tax news are 
significant and positively correlated to the number of words in tax disclosure and the quality 
of tax disclosure. The high-attention period is significant and positively correlated to the 
quality of tax disclosure, and it is not significant for the quantity of tax disclosure in terms of 
number of words. Taken together, these findings suggest that when a firm is the subject of 
negative tax news, the chance of the firm’s providing more tax disclosure and addressing 
relevant items of tax avoidance issues would be higher; however, the prediction of the same 
trend may be uncertain when the compound effects of pre-post effect and the intensity of 
media pressure are taken into account. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
4.4. Multivariate results analysis 
 
Tables 7 and 7.1 provide the results of the difference-in-differences regression for the entire 
sample and subsamples of financial and non-financial firms. The reason for separating the 
financial industry from others is to articulate the collective response of the financial industry 
to the negative publicity (Herremans et al., 2009), given that the maximum level of media 
pressure has focused on the financial industry (Figure 6). 
 
<Insert Table 7 here> 
<Insert Table 7.1 here> 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
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H1: Quality of tax disclosures 
 
Table 7 shows the result that there is an increasing trend of disclosure scores evidenced by 
the positive and significant coefficient on Post (p-value <0.05), but this is insignificant for 
firms in the financial industry. This indicates that control firms are more likely to improve 
quality of tax disclosure during the post-period, relative to the pre-period, but this general 
trend is not applied to the subsample of financial firms. However, when the difference of two 
groups is combined with the post effect (Treat x Post), a positive and significant impact is 
observed in the financial firms (p-value <0.05), but not for non-financial firms. The strong 
impact of media intensity on the disclosure score is found for all cases, as evidenced by a 
significant coefficient of Treat x Intensity; however, the direction of the impact is found to be 
opposite when the entire sample is divided into financial and non-financial groups. That is, 
the financial firms that have been to the subject of tax avoidance news are more likely to 
react positively by disclosing more tax items, whereas non-financial firms rather decrease 
their discussion of key tax items as media attention increases. When the post-period effect is 
added (Treat x Intensity x Post) as a main interest of this test, significance is identified only 
for the financial industry, but its direction is negative. This finding illustrates an interesting 
behaviour of the financial firms when their tax practices attract negative publicity. While the 
financial firms react positively to the media pressure by addressing more key tax items and 
thus increasing the quality of tax disclosures, they are rather discouraged to do so in relation 
to media intensity during the high media attention period. 
 
The test results for all three cases do not provide supportive evidence for the first hypothesis 
(H1). However, there are two noteworthy reverse patterns identified in this test. The first is 
that the higher the level of media intensity that the non-financial firms face, the less key tax 
items the non-financial firms discuss in their reports. The second pattern is that the positive 
reaction of the financial firms to the level of media intensity turns to a negative reaction with 
its compound effect of the post-period. 
H2: Quantity of tax disclosures 
 
Table 7.1 presents the results of the full sample. It suggests that generally the firms are more 
likely to increase the volume of tax disclosure during the post-period relative to the pre-
period, as the coefficient of Post is significant and positive (84.802; p -value <0.05). 
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However, when subsamples are compared, this significant effect of Post appears to be driven 
by non-financial firms that have a stronger effect. Other independent variables are 
insignificant for all cases. It appears that the matter of being the subject of news or its 
interaction with the volume of news articles does not influence the quantity of tax disclosure; 
therefore there is no evidence to support the second hypothesis (H2). 
 
4.5. Year-by-year and placebo analysis 
 
To test whether there is a significant difference in the quality and volume of tax disclosure in 
any year between the groups, the variable of post is disaggregated into year fixed effects for 
the years 2011-2013
13
 and then interacted with Treat and Intensity. As such, the following 
model is developed: 
                                                       
  
 
        
 
                 
 
               
   
 
                
 
                            
  
  
                                                            
  
  
                         
where i denotes the sample companies and t indicates years. 
 
Following the hypotheses of this study, the variables of main interest are year interactions 
with Treat and Intensity, where     and    are expected to be positive and significant in 
order to support the hypotheses of this study. The regression results are presented in Tables 8 
and 8.1. 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
<Insert Table 8.1 here> 
H1: Quality of tax disclosures 
 
Overall, it appears that 2013 is the main year that lifts the sensitivity of firms towards media 
exposure related to tax avoidance. For the entire firms and the subsample, the coefficient of 
Yr2013 x Treat is significant and positive. This suggests that the firms that are the subject of 
tax avoidance news are more likely to react positively by increasing their discussion of the 
                                                 
13 Year 2010 is the left-out year. 
19 
 
key tax items in their reports, and thus enhancing the quality of tax disclosure. This one-year 
time lag seems reasonable, given that generally corporate annual reports contain retrospective 
contents. Therefore, it might be difficult to expect an instant change in tax disclosure in 2012 
annual reports as a response to media scrutiny of tax matters during 2012. However, in the 
following year, firms may be able to change the contents of tax disclosure by addressing 
more relevant key tax items. 
 
However, when the effect of Intensity is interacted, the main focus of this test, different 
reactions are observed in each case. For the entire sample firms, significance is observed only 
in 2011, and it is uncertain as to which unidentified factors drive the firms to react positively 
to the media pressure in 2011 (0.078; p-value < 0.10), but not in 2012 or 2013. When testing 
the financial firms separately, significant but negative effects are found in the post-year 
interaction with Treat and Intensity (i.e. Yr2012*Treat*Intensity and Yr2013*Treat*Intensity), 
and the effects are stronger in 2013 (-0.235; p-value < 0.01) compared to 2012 (-0.201; p-
value < 0.05). On the other hand, insignificant effects of such variables are identified for non-
financial firms. In short, the result of this year-by-year analysis is consistent with the main 
test, above, and further confirms that the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the 
disclosure score and the level of media intensity during the post-period (H1) is not supported. 
Rather, an inverse relationship is identified with regard to the firms in the financial industry. 
 
H2: Quantity of tax disclosures 
 
Testing results of the entire sample show a significant and positive effect found in 2012 and 
2013 (p-value <0.05; <0.01 respectively), but insignificant effect for all of the year-interacted 
variables. From the subsample testing, a similar trend is also observed for non-financial firms. 
Such a general increase trend in the volume of tax disclosure in the post-period appears to 
reflect the ongoing amendments of International Accounting Standard 12 – Income Taxes 
which continually add disclosure requirements throughout the period. However, the same 
pattern does not apply to the case of the financial industry. It appears that the pre-post effect 
does not play a key role in influencing the extent of tax disclosure of the financial firms, as 
the positive and significant effect is already identified in 2011 (p-value <0.05). Moreover, the 
coefficients of year-interacted form (Year*Treat*Intensity) are also significant for all years 
(p-value <0.10) which barely differentiate more pronounced effects during the post-period. 
Arguably, strengthening banking regulations in the UK could be attributed to the growth of 
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tax disclosure by the financial firms throughout the years. Among others, the UK government 
introduced the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks in 2009 and the tax authorities 
(HMRC) published their governance Protocol on a Bank’s Compliance with the Code in 
March 2012.
14
 Similarly, there has been an increasing tax regulation of capital instruments by 
the UK tax authorities (HMRC) following the reform by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in June 2011.
15
 The direct correlation of such regulatory impacts, however, has 
not been confirmed in this test. 
 
Nevertheless, the test results cannot confirm that the volume of tax disclosure is higher when 
the firms were the subject of tax avoidance news during the high media attention period, 
based on the following results: first, the main interest of coefficients of Yr2012 * Treat * 
Intensity and Yr2013 * Treat * Intensity (    and    ) are insignificant for the full-sample 
and subsample for the non-financial test. Despite being significant for financial firms, the 
effects are not distinguished from the prior year (i.e. 2011); therefore the second hypothesis 
(H2) is not supported. 
 
4.6. Spillover effects analysis 
 
Given that the above test results document the positive and significant coefficients for the 
variables Post and Y2013, a question still remains as to why the control group also increases 
the quality and quantity of tax disclosure without a direct relationship with tax avoidance 
news. Presumably, an equally significant influence could come from peer pressure and 
industry spillover effects that have been identified in other types of corporate wrongdoings 
(Zavyalova et al., 2012). In other words, overall intensity of media pressure on tax avoidance 
would influence the firms not the subject of media attention (i.e. control group). By 
considering two factors, spillover from the same industry and outside industry,
16
 these further 
tests attempt to explore determinants of the case of the control group. As such, the following 
two models are tested: 
                                                 
14
 HMRC (2013). Strengthening the Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204321/130530_Code_consultati
on_Docprint_version.pdf. 
15
 HMRC (2011). Guidance on Basel III: Tax Treatment of Regulatory Capital Instruments, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/basel-iii-tax-treatment-of-regulatory-capital-instruments. 
16
 Spillover within industry refers to a total number of tax avoidance news articles associated with the same 
industry of the firm, and outside the industry refers to a total tax avoidance articles, except for the industry of 
the firm. 
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where i denotes the sample companies and t indicates years. 
 
                   refers to the total number of tax avoidance news articles of the treatment 
group within the same industry.                     refers to the total number of articles 
excluding the same industry as the firm. Therefore, those two variables will have a constant 
number by industry and year. Tables 9 and 9.1 show the regression results. 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
<Insert Table 9.1 here> 
 
Similar to the main findings, the spillover effects within and across the sector do not have any 
impact on the volume of tax disclosure. For the case of the spillover effects within industry, 
the post effect does not diminish, as the coefficients of disclosure score and tax disclosure are 
significant and positive at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. Thus, it is difficult to assert a 
direct relationship between the increased disclosure score and tax disclosure during the post-
period and the degree of media attention within and across the industry. A plausible 
explanation for the growth in the disclosure score would be that the control group also reacts 
to increasing public awareness of tax avoidance mixed with social disaffirmation and intense 
media attention on corporate tax issues in general. Likewise, it appears that the firms tend to 
comply with the regulatory requirement of increased tax-related disclosure, regardless of 
whether they are criticized by the media. Nevertheless, there may be other unobserved factors 
which have not been discovered in this study. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
The media agenda-setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2014) and previous 
studies of organizational impression management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007) suggest 
that public perception shaped by news media plays a significant role in threatening overall 
corporate reputation and image. Following this view, firms are expected to reflect escalating 
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media pressure on corporate tax avoidance issues when they communicate their tax affairs in 
their annual reports. This study empirically examines whether there is a relationship between 
increased media attention and corporate tax reporting behaviours. The test is based on the 
obvious discontinuity observed during the period from 2010 to 2013 in terms of the amount 
of news coverage of corporate tax avoidance. Such a natural external experimental setting 
allows for a separation of the test periods into low (Pre) and high (Post) media attention 
periods, while grouping the sample firms according to whether or not their tax practices were 
reported by media (i.e. treatment vs. control group). 
 
To assess the relationship with media intensity by period, both qualitative and quantitative 
disclosure measures are used. The tax disclosure score is used to evaluate the extent to which 
the firms explicitly address the most relevant tax items that can mitigate tax avoidance 
concerns. The quantitative measure of tax disclosure by counting the total number of words is 
intended to capture the changes in the volume of tax disclosure. 
 
In contrast to the prediction set out in the hypotheses, the test does not find evidence to 
support the hypotheses with regard to both disclosure measures. The observed general 
increase in the quality and quantity of tax disclosure are not associated with the recent 
increasing news media attention on corporate tax avoidance. As regards the quality of tax 
disclosure, the firms that have been the subject of negative tax news are more likely to 
respond to separate effects of media intensity and post-period effect by improving their tax 
disclosure. However, the combined effects of media intensity and post-period effect 
diminishes such positive reactions. For the financial firms that received the highest level of 
media attention, a negative relationship between disclosure quality and intensity is identified. 
That is, they rather decrease the discussion of key tax items in their reports as intensity 
increases. This can be attributed to a marginally decreasing effect of intensity as observed. 
Firms with high intensity react less to an increase in media attention than those with low 
intensity. As regards the volume of tax disclosure, it appears that the increasing trend of 
volume of tax disclosure is driven by the general increase in regulatory and accounting 
standards disclosure requirements, rather than by media pressure. In short, the results suggest 
that the increased media scrutiny of corporate tax avoidance itself does not necessary induce 
the improvement in corporate tax disclosure in terms of both quality and quantity; rather it 
can discourage firms to openly discuss sensitive tax issues. 
The findings of this study provide a novel insight into corporate reporting behaviour with 
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regard to tax avoidance concerns. More significantly, they highlight that corporate tax 
reporting is, by its nature, different from other types of corporate social and environmental 
disclosure. The commonly identified positive relationship between the level of media 
exposure and the extent of disclosure (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Darrell and Schwartz, 
1997; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Neu et al., 1998; Bewley and Li, 2000; Deegan et al., 2000; 
2002; Islam and Deegan, 2010) is not found in the case of corporate tax avoidance. It appears 
that a “do-not-respond” strategy (Benoit, 1997; Elsbach et al.,1998; van Staden, 2006) is 
more predominant than “over-disclosure” strategies (Blank 2008; 2009), especially when the 
media scrutiny of corporate tax reaches the maximum level. 
 
This study is subject to some limitations. First, due to the small number of firm-year 
observations, it is possible that the sample data may not be able to fully capture the actual 
pattern of a change in the corporate annual reports in the longer term. Second, the qualitative 
attributes in corporate tax reporting are assessed within narrow criteria as such overall 
credibility as to how genuine or faithful the tax information firms provide is not determined. 
 
The implications of this study are as follows. The notion of the agenda-setting role of news 
media (McCombs and Reynolds, 2002) is not well translated into a corporate tax reporting 
setting. Although a high level of media attention on tax avoidance is able to influence public 
perception of the wrongdoing firms, it does not play an essential role in increasing and 
improving tax disclosure. Rather, overly focused media pressure can bring about unintended 
outcomes, including firms’ decreased provision of the most publicly demanded tax 
information. This calls into question the real efficacy of the whole tax transparency agenda 
that has been heavily promoted by news media. Considering that firms establish the optimal 
level of disclosure policies based on a firm-specific cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Gigler and 
Hemmer, 2001), one single factor of external influence of the overheated media coverage of a 
firm’s tax affairs may not be able to shift the level of tax disclosure in an upward direction. 
 
One could also cast doubt on the credibility of news contents, as the news deliberately targets 
certain companies for popular appeal. By endorsing the actions of the protest groups against 
those targeted firms, news media may seek public attention on its news platform while 
maximizing public outrage towards multinational companies. This disputable effect of news 
media on corporate tax reporting leads to further questions as to what other factors might 
ultimately stimulate firms to voluntarily disclose more informative and faithful tax 
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information to public, other than regulatory enforcement such as accounting standards (e.g. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)). Given that the extent to which a firm is 
willing to provide the detailed and key tax information is largely determined by corporate 
managers, possible determinants could be found by linking to the individual characteristics of 
tax managers who take a more conservative approach towards tax management (Mulligan and 
Oats, 2009). 
 
Future research can be expanded to include other types of corporate communications such as 
press releases, corporate websites and corporate social responsibility reports. Cross-country 
analysis can also be considered, given the fact that each country’s different factors influence 
corporate reporting, such as the level of media pressure; stakeholders; and social, political, 
cultural and economic contexts (Adams, 2002). By examining a larger number of years and 
sample firms, one can observe how long such negative media effects might last by 
monitoring any form of change in corporate reporting behaviours. 
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Figure 1: Amount of news on tax avoidance in the UK major news media (Unspecified firms) 
 
Per FACTIVA news article search with the following key words: "tax avoidance", "tax evasion", "tax 
loophole(s)", "tax haven(s)", "tax transparency" and "aggressive tax planning".  
 
 
Figure 2: Amount of news on tax avoidance in the UK major news media (Sample firms) 
 
Per FACTIVA news article search with the following key words: "tax avoidance", "tax evasion", "tax 
loophole(s)", "tax haven(s)", "tax transparency" and "aggressive tax planning". 
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Figure 3: Average disclosure score by group and period 
 
 
 
n=80: Control-pre, Control-post; 
n=106: Treatment-pre, Treatment-post 
Tax Havens: Only one company in post-period has mentioned its tax position regarding having subsidiaries in tax haven. 
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Figure 4: Quality of tax disclosure: average disclosure score (Maximum score = 20) 
 
 
Figure 5: Quantity of tax disclosure: Total number of words in tax disclosure 
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Figure 6: Volume of news articles about tax avoidance by industry during the period 2010-2013 
 
Industries are clustered as: Industrials = Basic Materials, Industrial, Oil and Gas; Consumer = Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Healthcare; Financials = Banks and 
Financial services; Technology and Utilities = Technology, Telecommunication, Utilities. 
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Table 1: Sample construction 
 
t = 1: year 2010, t = 2: year 2011, t = 3 year 2012, t = 4 year 2013 
 
 
 
Table 2: Keywords in tax avoidance news articles and during the UK hearing 
News Subjects Keywords 
Amount of News Articles  # mentioned 
during the UK 
Hearing Yr. 2010 Yr. 2011 Yr. 2012 Yr. 2013 
Tax avoidance 
+ 
(or), 
 
Aggressive tax 
planning + 
(or), 
 
Tax evasion + 
Transparency 40 72 190 448 15 
Ethics 4 13 72 52 8 
Tax haven 89 50 244 231 15 
Effective Tax Rate 195 209 676 306 25 
Tax payments  73 43 238 151 52 
 
  
Pre Post Treatment group Control group 
Years 2010-2011 Years 2012-2013 Number of firms = 53 Number of firms = 40 
Low media 
attention 
High media 
attention 
∑               
 
   
 ∑               
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Table 3: Tax disclosure index (adapted from PwC Tax Transparency Framework, (PwC, 
2013)) 
Key tax items Checklist Description                                              (0 = no mention) 
Max 
Score 
Viewpoint on tax 
avoidance 
Discussion of tax policies and strategies within the context of: 
 Transparency 
 Corporate Ethics 
 Disclaimer about potential  tax avoidance 
(1= mention) 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
Reputational risk 
Acknowledgement of corporate reputational risk associated with tax  
(1= mention) 
1 
Tax haven 
 Information of subsidiaries located in tax havens 
(1= mention) 
1 
Responsibilities  
Clear indication of who is responsible for tax affairs. 
(1= mention, 2= elaborate) 
2 
Tax risk   
Explanation of tax risk management and how it is handled 
(1= mention, 2= elaborate) 
2 
Effective tax rate 
(ETR) 
 Discussion of tax charge  in relation to corporate profits 
 Clear reconciliation of the tax charge  to the statutory rate 
 Explicitly determined ETR as percentage %. 
 (1= indicated) 
1 
1 
1 
Cash tax 
payments 
 Discussion of cash tax payments in relation to corporate profits 
 Clear reconciliation of cash tax payments to the tax charge 
 Explicitly determined cash tax rate as percentage %. 
(1= indicated)  
1 
1 
1 
Geographical 
tax information 
Geographically broken-down tax information 
(1= minimum coverage, 2= disaggregated tax charges or payments by 
region or jurisdiction) 
2 
Total tax 
contribution 
Showing economic contribution of a company by paying varies types. 
(1= mention; 2= elaborate; 3= comprehensive) 
3 
Total Score  20 
 
Quality Scale – Disclosure concerning tax avoidance (adapted from van Staden and Hooks, 2007, p. 202) 
0 = None: no discussion of the issue; 1 = Mention; minimum coverage, little detail; 2 = Elaborate: the impact 
tax management of the company or its policies was clearly evident with detailed descriptions.  
3= Comprehensive: detailed descriptions supported by defined in monetary terms or actual physical quantities. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Full sample (n=372) 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max 
TaxDisc 1631 627 554 1208 1493 1990 5491 
Qty_tax 4.938 2.780 0.000 3.000 4.000 6.000 16.000 
Treatment 0.570 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Post 0.500 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
Intensity 5.189 16.806 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.000 195.000 
ETR 0.258 0.152 0.000 0.186 0.250 0.306 1.000 
Foreign_Sales 0.559 0.363 0.000 0.159 0.619 0.899 1.000 
Havens 85.108 117.957 0.000 19.000 47.000 95.000 618.000 
Size 8.745 1.415 4.911 7.608 8.848 9.714 12.590 
Ownership 0.393 0.171 0.111 0.276 0.346 0.464 0.930 
Age 112.511 83.937 2.000 30.000 110.000 287.000 323.000 
 
 
TaxDisc = total number of words in tax disclosure in the audited financial statements, Qty_tax = total score of tax disclosure according to the checklist (Appendix A); 
Treat= "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals "0" otherwise; Post = “1” for firm-year observations ending in 
2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense 
divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax 
havens; Size = company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = company age.
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the sample of firms with tax news (treatment) and firms without tax news (control) 
 
 Mean  Median 
Variables 
Treatment 
(n = 212) 
Control 
(n =160) 
Diff (p-value)  
Treatment 
(n = 212) 
Control 
(n =160) 
Diff (p-value) 
TaxDisc  1,736.0   1,492.0        244.0*** 
 
 1,624.0   1,428.0  196.0*** 
      Pre   1,712.0   1,438.0        274.0*** 
 
 1,503.0   1,325.0  178.0 
      Post  1,761.0   1,547.0        214.0** 
 
 1,659.0   1,440.0  219.0* 
Qty_tax 
    5.429     4.287   1.142***  
 
     5.000      5.000    0.000  
      Pre      4.896     3.975   0.921**  
 
     4.000      5.000    1.000  
      Post     5.962     4.600   1.362***  
 
     5.000      5.000   0.000** 
Intensity 
     5.189    0.000    5.189*** 
 
     1.000       0.000   1.000*** 
ETR 
     0.277    0.234    0.043** 
 
     0.259       0.234   0.025 
Foreign_Sales 
     0.500     0.636   -0.136*** 
 
     0.570       0.801  -0.231*** 
Havens 
117.226   42.550 74.676*** 
 
   65.000     27.000 38.000*** 
Size 
    9.179      8.169    1.010*** 
 
     9.413       8.010   1.403*** 
Ownership 
    0.384      0.404   -0.020* 
 
     0.336       0.349   -0.013 
Age 
115.613 108.400    7.213  
 
109.000  119.000 -10.000 
 
 
TaxDisc = total number of words in tax disclosure in the audited financial statements, Qty_tax = total score of tax disclosure according to the checklist (Appendix A); 
Treatment = if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period, and Control = otherwise; Post = firm-year observations ending in 2012-
2013; Pre = firm year observation ending in 2010-2011. Intensity = the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; ETR = effective 
tax rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore 
subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = 
company age. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6: Pearson correlations (n=372) 
 
 
 
TaxDisc = total number of words in tax disclosure in the audited financial statements, Qty_tax = total score of tax disclosure according to the checklist (Appendix A); 
Treat = "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals "0" otherwise; Post = “1” for firm-year observations ending in 
2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense 
divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax 
havens; Size = company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = company age. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
TaxDisc (1) 1.000           
Qty_tax (2) 0.3301*** 1.000          
Post (3) 0.060 0.157*** 1.000         
Treat (4) 0.193*** 0.204*** 0.000 1.000        
Intensity (5) 0.144*** 0.221*** 0.099* 0.199*** 1.000       
ETR (6) 0.059 0.062 0.040 0.138*** 0.308*** 1.000      
Foreign_Sales (7) 0.094* 0.001 -0.115** -0.187*** -0.065 0.039 1.000     
Havens (8) 0.286*** 0.161*** 0.000 0.314*** 0.429*** 0.114** 0.118** 1.000    
Size (9) 0.347*** 0.178*** 0.038 0.354*** 0.251*** 0.196*** 0.144*** 0.597*** 1.000   
Ownership (10) -0.020 0.028 0.000 -0.057 -0.078 -0.140*** -0.192*** -0.248*** -0.351*** 1.000  
Age (11) 0.088* 0.089* 0.012 0.043 0.250*** 0.051 0.150*** 0.265*** 0.329*** -0.255*** 1.000 
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Table 7: The impact of tax news on disclosure: Disclosure score (H1) 
 
 Disclosure score (H1) 
 Full-Sample 
Non-Financial 
Firms 
Financial Firms 
 Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Treat 
0.519 
(0.552) 
0.375 
(0.553) 
1.545 
(1.611) 
Post 
0.668** 
(0.301) 
0.740** 
(0.358) 
0.535 
(0.347) 
Intensity 
0.129* 
(0.077) 
-0.173** 
(0.065) 
0.204*** 
(0.044) 
Treat * Post 
0.678* 
(0.373) 
0.597 
(0.442) 
2.174** 
(0.773) 
Treat * Post * Intensity 
-0.109 
(0.067) 
0.033 
(0.057) 
-0.188*** 
(0.035) 
ETR 
0.011 
(1.262) 
1.008 
(1.747) 
-1.385 
(1.481) 
Foreign sales 
0.637 
(0.648) 
0.744 
(0.595) 
2.901 
(2.110) 
Havens 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
Size 
0.073 
(0.230) 
0.054 
(0.216) 
-0.297 
(0.805) 
Ownership 
1.211 
(1.923) 
2.573 
(2.211) 
-3.597 
(4.715) 
Age 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Constant  
2.755 
(2.359) 
2.178 
(2.474) 
6.111 
(7.267) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 300 72 
Adj. R² 0.121 0.122 0.293 
 
Treat = "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals "0" 
otherwise; Post = “1”for firm-year observations ending in 2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = the 
amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; ETR = effective tax rate (tax 
expense divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total 
sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = company size, measured as 
logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = 
company age. I report robust standard errors clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 7.1: The impact of tax news on disclosure: # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 
 # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 Full-Sample 
Non-Financial 
Firms 
Financial Firms 
 Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Treat 
162.944 
(146.546) 
70.954 
(136.646) 
432.942 
(418.166) 
Post 
106.203** 
(44.293) 
152.863*** 
(50.522) 
-68.887 
(80.967) 
Intensity 
-1.875 
(7.684) 
11.720 
(8.683) 
-16.436 
(14.191) 
Treat * Post 
-65.485 
(69.260) 
-75.305 
(67.316) 
-91.992 
(291.259) 
Treat* Post * Intensity 
1.996 
(5.960) 
-4.652 
(11.227) 
14.083 
(12.600) 
ETR 
-125.393 
(257.967) 
-144.894 
(345.343) 
191.310 
(184.662) 
Foreign sales 
104.775 
(176.204) 
120.773 
(160.557) 
286.467 
(518.594) 
Havens 
0.691 
(0.499) 
1.564*** 
(0.450) 
-0.248 
(1.344) 
Size 
129.160** 
(51.624) 
11.999 
(44.093) 
294.302 
(222.900) 
Ownership 
236.102 
(446.740) 
837.603 
(526.817) 
-369.047 
(1161.764) 
Age 
-0.313 
(0.636) 
-0.930 
(0.748) 
0.083 
(1.620) 
Constant  
503.980 
(614.673) 
1171.208 
(601.260) 
-949.271 
(2217.668) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 300 72 
Adj. R² 0.218 0.265 0.419 
 
Treat = "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals 
"0" otherwise; Post = “1” for firm-year observations ending in 2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = 
the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; ETR = effective tax 
rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided 
by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = company size, 
measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 
investors; Age = company age. I report robust standard errors clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 8: Year-by-year and placebo analysis: Disclosure score (H1) 
 Disclosure score (H1) 
 
Full-Sample 
Non-Financial 
Firms 
Financial Firms 
Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Treat 
0.475 
(0.547) 
0.244 
(0.588) 
1.377 
(1.525) 
Intensity 
0.083 
(0.086) 
-0.161*** 
(0.054) 
0.225** 
(0.092) 
Yr2011 
0.149 
(0.141) 
0.165 
(0.166) 
0.043 
(0.320) 
Yr2012 
0.407 
(0.310) 
0.457 
(0.369) 
0.342 
(0.440) 
Yr2013 
1.114*** 
(0.399) 
1.230** 
(0.484) 
0.729 
(0.508) 
Yr2011 * Treat  
0.143 
(0.261) 
0.361 
(0.292) 
0.768 
(0.795) 
Yr2012 * Treat  
0.372 
(0.393) 
0.539 
(0.461) 
1.620 
(0.931) 
Yr2013 * Treat 
1.175** 
(0.561) 
1.177* 
(0.683) 
3.991*** 
(1.282) 
Yr2011 * Treat * Intensity 
0.078* 
(0.040) 
-0.102 
(0.098) 
-0.031 
(0.073) 
Yr2012 * Treat * Intensity 
-0.059 
(0.080) 
-0.073 
(0.057) 
-0.201** 
(0.084) 
Yr2013 * Treat * Intensity 
-0.082 
(0.064) 
0.011 
(0.068) 
-0.235*** 
(0.075) 
ETR 
0.227 
(1.268) 
0.842 
(1.768) 
-1.123 
(1.871) 
Foreign sales 
0.842 
(0.661) 
0.975 
(0.606) 
3.663 
(2.229) 
Havens 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
Size 
0.064 
(0.229) 
0.061 
(0.217) 
-0.423 
(0.848) 
Ownership 
1.364 
(1.933) 
2.621 
(2.256) 
-3.591 
(4.938) 
Age 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
Constant  
2.433 
(2.357) 
1.885 
(2.519) 
6.491 
(7.579) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 300 72 
Adj. R² 0.135 0.147 0.258 
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Treat = "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals "0" 
otherwise; Intensity = the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; 
ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = 
foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = 
company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by 
top 10 investors; Age = company age. I report robust standard errors clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 8.1: Year-by-year and placebo analysis: # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 
Full-Sample 
Non-Financial 
Firms 
Financial Firms 
Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Treat 
167.296 
(150.841) 
64.140 
(147.951) 
556.830 
(464.223) 
Intensity 
-7.161 
(9.495) 
9.769 
(7.909) 
-42.388** 
(19.750) 
Yr2011 
43.487 
(40.571) 
26.718 
(46.373) 
228.320** 
(95.434) 
Yr2012 
106.230* 
(54.509) 
139.997** 
(64.672) 
5.419 
(62.962) 
Yr2013 
150.741** 
(62.064) 
194.202*** 
(73.468) 
56.158 
(130.045) 
Yr2011 * Treat  
-6.366 
(51.955) 
11.430 
(59.635) 
-196.102 
(134.049) 
Yr2012 * Treat  
-57.367 
(73.572) 
-64.120 
(75.468) 
-161.069 
(361.645) 
Yr2013 * Treat 
-81.640 
(82.681) 
-67.083 
(103.583) 
-326.171 
(320.441) 
Yr2011 * Treat * Intensity 
9.067 
(8.376) 
7.282 
(13.402) 
30.487* 
(17.126) 
Yr2012 * Treat * Intensity 
7.331 
(8.339) 
-0.445 
(8.168) 
38.095* 
(19.308) 
Yr2013 * Treat * Intensity 
6.711 
(7.157) 
-4.690 
(18.666) 
37.507* 
(18.944) 
ETR 
-101.036 
(266.125) 
-146.461 
(352.704) 
506.028** 
(200.558) 
Foreign sales 
110.043 
(181.196) 
129.178 
(165.513) 
191.818 
(552.435) 
Havens 
0.698 
(0.504) 
1.556*** 
(0.453) 
0.098 
(1.311) 
Size 
128.862** 
(52.019) 
11.448 
(44.704) 
295.181 
(231.849) 
Ownership 
244.006 
(450.324) 
841.051 
(532.694) 
-248.798 
(1257.312) 
Age 
-0.314 
(0.643) 
-0.927 
(0.758) 
0.240 
(1.704) 
Constant  
469.437 
(619.988) 
1153.949* 
(608.003) 
-1211.958 
(2401.066) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 372 300 72 
Adj. R² 0.206 0.251 0.383 
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Treat = "1" if the firm has been reported in the tax news more than once during the testing period and equals "0" 
otherwise; Intensity = the amount of news articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; 
ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = 
foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = 
company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the portion of total outstanding shares held by 
top 10 investors; Age = company age. I report robust standard errors clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 9: Spillover effects: Within industry 
 
 Control group 
 Disclosure score (H1) # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Post 
0.671* 
(0.374) 
133.719** 
(55.681) 
Spillover_within 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
3.517 
(2.579) 
Spillover_within * Post 
0.007 
(0.010) 
-2.947 
(1.929) 
ETR 
2.852* 
(1.644) 
-148.261 
(336.050) 
Foreign sales 
-0.230 
(0.625) 
-35.857 
(211.301) 
Havens 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
3.337 
(2.385) 
Size 
0.064 
(0.317) 
105.656 
(76.143) 
Ownership 
1.454 
(2.518) 
151.78** 
(62.270) 
Age 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
1.592 
(1.207) 
Constant  
1.559 
(2.282) 
-76.599 
(586.134) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes 
Observations 160 160 
Adj. R² 0.266 0.183 
 
Post = “1” for firm-year observations ending in 2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = the amount of news 
articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; Spillover = total number of tax avoidance 
news articles of the treatment group within the same industry; Spillover_outside = total number of the articles 
except for the same industry of the firm. ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), 
bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's 
offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the 
portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = company age. I report robust standard errors 
clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 9.1: Spillover effects: Outside industry 
 
 Control group 
 Disclosure score (H1) # Words in tax disclosure (H2) 
 Code 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
Coefficient 
(Std.Err) 
 Post 
0.278 
(0.840) 
-183.934 
(147.831) 
 Spillover_outside 
0.003 
(0.016) 
-3.535 
(2.892) 
 Spillover_outside * Post 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
2.933 
(2.079) 
ETR 
2.792 
(1.658) 
-149.839 
(337.335) 
Foreign sales 
-0.245 
(0.625) 
-34.134 
(211.884) 
Havens 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
3.330 
(2.381) 
Size 
0.068 
(0.317) 
105.819 
(76.139) 
Ownership 
1.445 
(2.521) 
151.86** 
(62.308) 
Age 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
1.592 
(1.207) 
Constant  
1.105 
(2.672) 
474.929 
(809.695) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Cluster by firm Yes Yes 
Observations 160 160 
Adj. R² 0.265 0.181 
 
Post = “1” for firm-year observations ending in 2012-2013 and "0" for otherwise. Intensity = the amount of news 
articles in relation to tax avoidance issues associated with the firm; Spillover = total number of tax avoidance 
news articles of the treatment group within the same industry; Spillover_outside = total number of the articles 
except for the same industry of the firm. ETR = effective tax rate (tax expense divided by pre-tax income), 
bounded between [0,1]; Foreign_Sales = foreign sales divided by total sales; Havens = total number of a firm's 
offshore subsidiaries in tax havens; Size = company size, measured as logarithm of total sales; Ownership = the 
portion of total outstanding shares held by top 10 investors; Age = company age. I report robust standard errors 
clustered by entity in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
